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multi-country model. Evaluating the Irish experience against 
patterns derived from a wider set of industrial countries may 
allow us to obtain general insights into the dynamics of the 
European sovereign debt crisis.
The backdrop for our analysis is a recently advanced empiri-
cal model of the market for government bonds.2 The current 
paper narrates Ireland’s odyssey from the beginnings of the 
ﬁ nancial crisis to its sovereign debt crisis through the eyes of 
this quantitative model.
The empirical background
In essence, Gärtner and Griesbach3 attempt to quantify the 
model of the market for government bonds proposed by 
Romer.4 This simple two-equation model derives from ide-
as put forward by Calvo.5 It focusses on the interaction be-
tween the default risk and the interest rate and models this by 
means of two equations:
• When default risk increases, the market requests a higher 
risk premium, and the interest rate goes up;
• When the interest rate goes up, default risk increases.
Non-linearities in these equations may generate multiple 
equilibria in the market for government bonds. Equilibria are 
2 M. G ä r t n e r, B. G r i e s b a c h : Rating agencies, self-fulﬁ lling prophe-
cy and multiple equilibria? An empirical model of the European sover-
eign debt crisis 2009-2011, University of St. Gallen, SEPS, Discussion 
Paper No. 2012-15.
3 Ibid.
4 D. R o m e r : Advanced Macroeconomics, 4th edition, McGraw-Hill Ir-
win, New York 2012, pp. 632-639.
5 See G.A. C a l v o : Servicing the public debt: The role of expectations, 
in: American Economic Review, Vol. 78, No. 4, 1988, pp. 647-661; and 
D. R o m e r, op. cit.
In an extraordinary turn of events, the euro area’s fastest-
growing and second-richest country in terms of per capita 
income became the ﬁ rst to petition the European Union for a 
bailout on 21 November 2010. An international ﬁ nancial res-
cue package of €90bn, almost 60 per cent of Ireland’s 2010 
GDP, was handed over by the troika of the European Com-
mission, the European Central Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund in the form of a three-year loan. This ﬁ nalised 
the transformation of the global ﬁ nancial crisis into a sover-
eign debt crisis, putting public ﬁ nances and the market for 
government debt centre stage and presenting governments 
as the new villains. At the same time, it permitted the ﬁ nancial 
industry to drift out of the limelight.
A number of contributions discuss this transformation in 
general and Ireland’s own recent economic and political or-
deal in particular.1 This paper attempts to add to and com-
plement this debate from the perspective of an econometric 
1 Informative examples are S. D e l l e p i a n e , N. H a rd i m a n : Govern-
ing the Irish Economy: A Triple Crisis, in: N. H a rd i m a n  (ed.): Irish 
Governance in crisis, Manchester 2012, Manchester University Press, 
pp. 83-109;  N. H a rd i m a n , A. R e g a n : The politics of austerity in Ire-
land, in: Intereconomics, Vol. 48, No. 1, 2013, pp. 9-14; K. W h e l a n : 
Ireland’s Sovereign Debt Crisis, University College Dublin, UCD Cen-
tre for Economic Research Working Paper Series, WP11/09, May 2011.
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of self-fulﬁ lling prophecy in which downgrades and interest 
rate hikes chase and reinforce each other. At the end of this 
process, default looms. This is the third, “bad” equilibrium in 
this scenario.
The situation of individual countries is likely to differ from this 
synthetic constellation based on sample means, because 
country-speciﬁ c fundamentals must be used for position-
ing the rating curve. Depending on the relative position of the 
two curves, multiple equilibria may, but do not have to, arise. 
If the rating curve is located high (low) enough relative to the 
interest rate curve, only the good (bad) equilibrium may exist 
and be globally stable.
In this graphical display of the market for government bonds, 
the debt rating may change for two reasons. First, it may 
change because fundamentals change. This shifts the rat-
ing curve and changes the rating accordingly at any given 
interest rate. We may call this the “impact effect”. Second, 
because the interest rate changes, this causes the country to 
slide up or down a given rating curve.
This second effect, the “interest rate effect”, should be kept 
apart from the impact effect, because the interest rate is an 
endogenous variable that itself responds to downgrades 
and also because the effect is likely to take time. Increases 
in the interest rate affect the government’s budget only when 
bonds expire and/or new ones have to be issued that carry 
higher interest rates. The speed at which this happens de-
pends on such things as the maturity structure of a coun-
try’s debt, the way in which expectations are formed, or the 
presence of such phenomena as bandwagon effects or herd 
behaviour. In Gärtner and Griesbach’s recursive model, this 
affected by fundamentals that include government deﬁ cits 
and debt, income growth and the interest rate on risk-free 
assets. They may be stable or unstable. Unstable equilibria 
constitute thresholds beyond which a self-enforcing process 
of increasing default risk and rising interest rates may loom.
Gärtner and Griesbach6 modify the model with the following 
assumptions:
• The market uses sovereign debt ratings as a measure of 
default risk;
• Changes in the interest rate may affect default risk with a 
lag due to the long maturity of government debt titles.
Figure 1 displays estimates of the interest rate curve and the 
rating curve that result from panel regressions using annual 
data from 25 OECD countries for the period 1999-2011.7 The 
rating curve shows how, for a given set of fundamentals, 
interest rates affect ratings. The curve is linear in the seg-
ment covered by the data. The underlying equation explains 
some 60 per cent of the variations of ratings across time and 
among countries. Signiﬁ cant fundamentals that would shift 
the curve to the right if they deteriorate are mainly the deﬁ cit 
and primary deﬁ cit ratios and the public debt ratio, but also 
income levels and growth.
The interest rate curve is nonlinear, implying that successive 
downgrades have increasingly strong effects on the interest 
rate. The curve shifts up and down with the German interest 
rate, which serves as a proxy for the risk-free rate. The rat-
ings raised to the third power explain 80 per cent of the vari-
ations in interest rates across countries and time. The curves 
are positioned using the sample means of fundamentals for 
the countries in the panel for the period under consideration. 
This constellation generates three equilibria. Two of them co-
incide with points of intersection of the two curves.
Point A is a “good” equilibrium with low interest rates and 
good ratings. It is locally stable because if a rating, for ex-
ample, was erroneously set too high, this would drive up the 
interest rate, but not as much as actually required to justify 
the rating. Thus, the rating would eventually return to its (cor-
rect) initial value. Point B is an unstable equilibrium. Once the 
rating moves beyond the level associated with this point, it 
generates an increase in the interest rate that is so large that 
it requires further downgrades. We therefore enter a region 
6 M. G ä r t n e r, B. G r i e s b a c h , op. cit.
7 The sample includes Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, the Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ire-
land, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, 
Portugal, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United King-
dom and the United States. The depicted equations are equation (1), 
table 2 and equation (4), table 3.
Figure 1
The empirical model
S o u rc e : M. G ä r t n e r, B. G r i e s b a c h : Rating agencies, self-fulﬁ lling 
prophecy and multiple equilibria? An empirical model of the European 
sovereign debt crisis 2009-2011, University of St. Gallen, SEPS, Discus-
sion Paper No. 2012-15, Figure 5(b).
In
te
re
st
 r
at
e 
i a
nd
 la
gg
es
t 
in
te
re
st
 r
at
e 
i -1
Sovereign debt rating r (1 = AAA)
20
10
0
0 5 10 15
interest rate curve
rating curve
(unstable equilibrium;
threshold)
(stable, “good” equilibrium)
i 
iA
B
r Br A
Intereconomics 2013 | 6
360
Sovereign Debt
the euro, which Ireland had adopted as one of the ﬁ rst-wave 
countries.
By placing Ireland into the context of the empirical model of 
the market for sovereign bonds, Figure 2 shows four things:
• Ireland’s current interest rate and rating curves. These use 
the coefﬁ cients reported by Gärtner and Griesbach,13 de-
rived from data for 25 OECD countries over the time pe-
riod 1999-2011, and are positioned by inserting Ireland’s 
own fundamentals for the year 2007.
• Ireland’s 2007 interest rate and rating according to the 
model (indicated by the black dot). The rating is obtained 
by extending a horizontal line from the 2006 interest rate, 
which stood at 3.5 per cent, from the ordinate to the right 
and ﬁ nding its intersection with the rating curve. The 2007 
interest rate is obtained by extending a vertical line from 
the identiﬁ ed 2007 credit rating upwards to the interest 
rate curve.
• Ireland’s long-run equilibrium implied by the 2007 funda-
mentals. This is determined by the intersection of these 
two curves. This point indicates the levels towards which, 
as long as the fundamentals remain unchanged, the gov-
ernment bond yields and sovereign debt ratings should 
eventually converge in order to ﬁ t the experience of all the 
countries and years in the sample.
• Ireland’s actual government bond yields and sovereign 
debt ratings in 2007, indicated by an “x”.
13 M. G ä r t n e r, B. G r i e s b a c h , op. cit.
lagged response is captured parsimoniously by making rat-
ings dependent on the previous year’s interest rate.8 This ef-
fect via the interest rate can occur if at least one of the two 
conditions holds: either we are not operating on the horizon-
tal segment of the interest curve or the risk-free rate, which 
positions the interest curve, changes.
In the next section, the discussion of Ireland’s experience 
focusses on fundamentals and the impact effect that these 
have on ratings and interest rates. The section on caveats 
below shows that this is justiﬁ ed since the results do not dif-
fer to any relevant extent from the ratings we obtain by in-
cluding the interest rate effect or even from looking at the full 
equilibrium effects.
The Irish odyssey
We now turn to Ireland’s development from its pre-crisis 
comfort zone to the scary days of near bankruptcy, rising 
unemployment, falling living standards, and an exodus of 
capital and young minds.9 The empirical model and graph 
described in the previous section serve as an organising de-
vice, and the focus is on the variables that drive this model. 
As in Gärtner and Griesbach,10 the ratings used are Fitch’s 
ratings mapped onto a numerical scale that increases from 
1=AAA to 21=D.
2007: “AAA+” with a positive outlook
After two decades of reforms and relentless stabilisation ef-
forts, Ireland had managed to reduce its public debt from 110 
per cent of GDP in 1987 to 25 per cent in 2007, the lowest in 
the euro area, bar Luxembourg and Slovenia.11 Per capita in-
come was among the highest in Europe at €43,500, as were 
income growth rates, which averaged 5.6 per cent between 
2000 and 2007. The government budget, which had never vi-
olated the Maastricht deﬁ cit ratio threshold of three per cent, 
was marginally positive at 0.1 per cent of GDP.12 The interest 
rate on Irish government bonds stood at a comfortable level 
of 4.5 per cent, and the country continued to enjoy a AAA rat-
ing from all three major rating agencies – from Fitch Ratings 
and Moody’s since 1998 and from Standard & Poor’s since 
2002, the year that saw the completion of the introduction of 
8 Ibid.
9 See Bloomberg: Capital Flight Leaves Banks in Germany Awash in 
Deposits, 8 June 2012, available at  http://www.bloomberg.com/
news/2012-06-07/capital-ﬂ ight-leaves-banks-in-germany-awash-in-
cheap-deposits.html. Already in 2009, capital ﬂ ight reached about 
€120bn according to R. N e u b ä u m e r : Eurokrise: Keine Staats-
schuldenkrise, sondern Folge der Finanzkrise, in: Wirtschaftsdienst, 
Vol. 91, No. 12, 2011, p. 830. In terms of emigration, see N. H a rd i -
m a n , A. R e g a n : The politics of austerity in Ireland, op. cit., p. 12.
10 M. G ä r t n e r, B. G r i e s b a c h , op. cit.
11 Source: World Economic Outlook Database, April 2012.
12 The main source for the data reported and discussed in this paper is 
the OECD Economic Outlook No 90 database.
Figure 2
Ireland in 2007
S o u rc e : Authors’ calculations based on estimates in M. G ä r t n e r, B. 
G r i e s b a c h : Rating agencies, self-fulﬁ lling prophecy and multiple equi-
libria? An empirical model of the European sovereign debt crisis 2009-
2011, University of St. Gallen, SEPS, Discussion Paper No. 2012-15, Fig-
ure 5(b).
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could be attributed to the erosion of government ﬁ nances. 
Half of this, in turn, was caused by an increase in the primary 
deﬁ cit ratio, which rose to six per cent. The other half was 
due to the debt ratio leaping from 28.75 per cent to 49.6 per 
cent. No other included fundamental variable had an impact 
that contributed to more than ten per cent of the required 
downgrade.
Two factors drove the government budget deep into the red. 
The ﬁ rst and major one is the collapse of tax revenues. As in 
many other countries, the negative real effects of the ﬁ nan-
cial crisis on economic activity resulted in a substantial loss 
in tax revenues and an increase in social welfare spending. 
The effects on taxes were aggravated by the fact that a re-
design of the tax system during the boom years had reduced 
the share of income-based tax revenues and increased 
the share of asset-based tax revenues. Since the latter are 
not levied on property or wealth but paid as a stamp tax 
only when residential property is purchased, they dropped 
sharply when the building industry screeched to a halt. A 
second negative budget effect resulted from increased so-
cial welfare outlays. Besides the €6.4bn drop in tax revenues 
and a €2.9bn increase in social welfare spending, the main 
contributor to the €13bn deﬁ cit that accumulated during the 
ﬁ rst recession year was triggered by a 64 per cent increase 
in net capital outlays compared to the previous year.14 Com-
bined with some €20bn that the government had raised but 
14 The change of the net capital outlay of the government is mainly driv-
en by the capital transfers paid and other capital payments, which 
increased by 77 per cent with respect to the previous year in value 
terms.
There is no noteworthy discrepancy between Ireland’s actual 
experience and the prediction of the model. The actual inter-
est rate matches the model’s interest rate almost perfectly. 
The fundamentals would have justiﬁ ed an even better rat-
ing of -0.3. However, this would burst the bounds of Fitch’s 
rating scale, which ends at AAA (=1). This gap of -1.3 rating 
classes could be seen as a cushion, a protective buffer for 
the country’s top rating, should fundamentals deteriorate in 
future years.
2008: When Lehman Brothers collapsed and money mar-
kets froze
This was the year when the global real estate and ﬁ nancial 
crisis erupted in full force. The bankruptcy of Lehman Broth-
ers, the fourth-largest investment ﬁ rm in the United States 
at the time, sent shivers around the globe. In Ireland, a num-
ber of those variables that the econometric model identiﬁ es 
as key determinants of a sovereign’s solvency, as measured 
by its credit rating, changed for the worse, moving the rating 
curve to the right (see Figure 3). Here, dark curves depict the 
current year. Light-coloured curves depict the previous year 
to help visualise the change that occurred.
The ﬁ rst repercussions of uncertainty and panic in the ﬁ nan-
cial markets and of the bursting housing bubble were felt in 
the labour market, as unemployment rose from 4.6 per cent 
to 6.1 per cent. At the same time, Ireland’s GDP shrank by 
three per cent. In September, Ireland became the ﬁ rst euro 
area country declared to be in recession. However, Ireland 
was still able to obtain credit in the ﬁ nancial markets, even at 
a slightly lower interest rate of 4.3 per cent compared with 4.5 
per cent in 2007. But since German government bond yields, 
taken as a proxy for the risk-free rate, had fallen from 4.5 per 
cent in 2007 to 3.2 per cent, pushing the interest rate down, 
Irish rates should have fallen still further. However, this gap is 
small. It suggests that even after the global scare triggered 
by Lehman Brothers’ insolvency, government bonds were 
still considered safe investments both at the centre and on 
the fringes of the euro area.
In an attempt to safeguard the nation’s banking system after 
the collapse of Lehman Brothers, but arguably sowing disas-
ter for years to come, the government announced an uncon-
ditional guarantee of €440bn for more or less all liabilities of 
Ireland’s major banks. While considered bold and unavoid-
able at the time, it is quite possible that Ireland would have 
taken an entirely different path without this step.
The combined effect of all the relevant deteriorations of fun-
damentals increased Ireland’s insolvency risk to an extent 
that would have called for an immediate downgrade of its 
sovereign debt rating by 1.4 notches. This is how far the rat-
ing curve shifted to the right. About two-thirds of this shift 
Figure 3
Ireland in 2008
S o u rc e : Authors’ calculations based on estimates in M. G ä r t n e r, B. 
G r i e s b a c h : Rating agencies, self-fulﬁ lling prophecy and multiple equi-
libria? An empirical model of the European sovereign debt crisis 2009-
2011, University of St. Gallen, SEPS, Discussion Paper No. 2012-15, Fig-
ure 5(b).
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Fitch Ratings issued for Ireland, interpreted as a downgrade 
by half a notch, appears justiﬁ ed, though at the end of the 
year rather than in March. The actual downgrade by a full 
three notches must be termed excessive when measured 
against what the econometric model suggests.
2010: Rien ne va plus
During this year the situation went from bad to worse. This 
was not so much the case for the real economy, in which 
the recession appeared to bottom out with another (mod-
est) contraction of 0.4 per cent, accompanied by a further 
rise in the unemployment rate to 13.7 per cent. The real 
shocker was an unprecedented government budget deﬁ cit 
of 31.3 per cent, which pushed the debt ratio to 98.5 per cent 
– well beyond the once famous and now infamous 90 per 
cent threshold.17 The main contributor to this eye-watering 
17 In a highly inﬂ uential paper that seemed to provide the intellectual and 
empirical underpinnings for austerity policies, C.M. R e i n h a r t , K.S. 
R o g o f f : Growth in a time of debt, in: American Economic Review, 
Vol. 100, No. 2, 2010, pp. 573-578, suggested that there was a thresh-
old in the government debt-to-GDP ratio at the 90 per cent mark be-
yond which income growth turns negative. Scrutinising their work, T. 
H e r n d o n , M. A s h , R. P o l l i n : Does High Public Debt Consistently 
Stiﬂ e Economic Growth? A Critique of Reinhart and Rogoff, Univer-
sity of Massachusetts Amherst, Political Economy Research Institute 
showed that once data omissions, weighting oddities and coding er-
rors are taken into account, this threshold becomes a mirage. For a 
non-technical summary of the controversy triggered by this criticism, 
see J. C a s s i d y : The Reinhart and Rogoff controversy: A summing 
up, in: The New Yorker, 29 April 2013, available at http://www.newyo-
rker.com/online/blogs/johncassidy/2013/04/the-rogoff-and-reinhart-
controversy-a-summing-up.html.
put aside for the promised future support of ailing banks, the 
7.3 per cent deﬁ cit ratio jolted the public debt-to-GDP ratio to 
49.6 per cent.
While the movement of all the predetermined variables in the 
year when the ﬁ nancial crisis erupted would have justiﬁ ed a 
downgrade of Irish sovereign debt by 1.4 notches, as men-
tioned above, Fitch Ratings retained its AAA rating (as did 
Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s). Since the suggested 1.4 
notches match the buffer that Ireland’s AAA rating had inher-
ited from 2007, the top rating in 2008 is fully justiﬁ ed, reﬂ ect-
ing the country’s fundamentals almost perfectly.
2009: The year everything changed
By 2009, the ﬁ nancial crisis was felt in many parts of the real 
economy. While the recession had started in 2008 and had 
already been ofﬁ cially declared, it was now in full force. In-
come plunged by another seven per cent and caused the 
unemployment rate to almost double from 6.1 per cent to 
11.8 per cent. Inevitably, this caused tax revenues to recede 
still further, by another €7.5bn, which raised net borrowing to 
€28.7bn or 13.9 per cent of GDP for the year and pushed the 
debt ratio up to 64.8 per cent.
While there had still not been any signiﬁ cant and sustained 
move in the interest rates on Irish government bonds, rating 
agencies issued their ﬁ rst credit warnings as early as spring. 
Fitch Ratings put Ireland on a negative watch on 6 March. It is 
not without irony that Fitch Ratings justiﬁ ed this action by “a 
slump in government tax revenue”, to which – via the global 
recession triggered by the ﬁ nancial crisis – rating agencies 
were major contributors.15 Fitch Ratings downgraded Ireland 
a month later by one notch to AA+ and again on 4 November 
by another two notches to a AA rating.16
As Figure 4 reveals, the empirical model is unable to trace 
these downgrades. The negative repercussions of the ﬁ nan-
cial crisis for the Irish economy shifted the rating curve to the 
right by less than half a notch. Most of this impact effect can 
be linked to the signiﬁ cant increase in the country’s debt ratio 
and dropping income levels. However, an almost matching 
effect in the opposite direction came from the disappearance 
of inﬂ ation with its positive consequences for the country’s 
competitiveness. Measured against these combined effects, 
at a virtually unchanged interest rate, the negative watch that 
15 Bloomberg: Ireland May Lose Its AAA Credit Rating, Fitch Says (Up-
date3), 6 March 2009, available at http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/
news?pid=21070001&sid=azL2C1io0Hbg.
16 While we focus on Fitch’s ratings here, as these are used in M. G ä r t -
n e r, B. G r i e s b a c h , op. cit., it is worth noting that Fitch Ratings’ 
downgrades of Ireland were preceded by Standard & Poor’s actions. 
Standard & Poor’s had changed Ireland’s outlook to negative on 
9 January 2009 and was the ﬁ rst agency to start actual downgrades 
on 30 March, when it lowered Ireland’s rating to AA+.
Figure 4
Ireland in 2009
S o u rc e : Authors’ calculations based on estimates in M. G ä r t n e r, B. 
G r i e s b a c h : Rating agencies, self-fulﬁ lling prophecy and multiple equi-
libria? An empirical model of the European sovereign debt crisis 2009-
2011, University of St. Gallen, SEPS, Discussion Paper No. 2012-15, Fig-
ure 5(b).
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by about 0.8 percentage points per notch.24 Given that Fitch 
Ratings downgraded Ireland by four notches, this roughly 
accounts for the vertical discrepancy between the actual in-
terest rate and the rating curve.
The year ended with a bang when, on 21 November, Ireland 
became the ﬁ rst country to ask for an international bailout. 
The reason was that the government had dramatically under-
estimated the risks hidden in Irish banks, for which it had is-
sued an unconditional guarantee in 2008.
2011: Light at the end of the tunnel?
This year’s silver lining was the return of income growth. How-
ever, at 1.2 per cent it remained but a shadow of the growth 
to which Ireland had become accustomed during its tiger 
years. Additionally, it was not enough to prevent the unem-
ployment rate from creeping up still further, to 14.4 per cent. 
The government’s budget deﬁ cit remained well in the double 
digits (13.4 per cent), pushing the debt ratio to 117.6 per cent. 
The achievements of 20 years of economic reforms, budg-
etary discipline and consensus building had been lost in as 
little as four years. On the positive side, the primary balance 
continued to improve to -3.6 per cent of potential GDP.
The aggregate effect of these mixed movements of funda-
mentals was another small shift of the rating curve to the 
24 There appears to be no symmetry in this effect. While downgrades 
are found to push the market into a panic mode, in which interest 
rates overreact, there is no comparable response when a sovereign is 
upgraded. See M. G ä r t n e r, B. G r i e s b a c h , op. cit., Table 4, equa-
tion (8).
number was €31bn in aid to the distressed banking sector.18 
While the government’s plan was to spread the cost of this 
support over a decade, EU accounting rules required the full 
amount to be included in Ireland’s 2009 budget calculations.
Figure 5 shows that in 2010 Ireland completely deviated from 
the patterns derived from the past and from other countries. 
Further deterioration of the fundamentals shifted the rating 
curve to the right by another 0.7 notches, suggesting a AA+ 
rating, one notch below AAA. This shift was almost entirely 
due to the exploding debt ratio. The deﬁ cit also contributed 
to this, but its effect was mostly reversed by the ﬁ rst signs of 
improvement in the primary deﬁ cit. However, while the es-
tablished patterns recommended an AA+ rating, well within 
investment grade territory, Fitch Ratings bestowed on the 
country a BBB+ rating, which is a full six notches worse than 
AA+. The rationale given for the downgrade was:
The downgrade reﬂ ects the additional ﬁ scal costs of 
restructuring and supporting the banking system (…); 
weaker prospects and greater uncertainty regarding the 
economic outlook as a result of the recent intensiﬁ cation 
of the ﬁ nancial crisis; and the associated loss of access to 
market funding at an affordable cost (…).19
Therefore, it is again the recession and the ailing banking 
system, plus (and here some circularity creeps into the argu-
ment) the rising interest rates that the Irish government faces 
in the bond market, which of course are at least partly driven 
by the ratings, as Gärtner and Griesbach20 show.21
The model’s impact response to this downgrade would have 
been an increase in Ireland’s interest rate to about 6.5 per 
cent. The actual response was even stronger, with the in-
terest rate surging to 9.1 per cent by the end of 2010. This 
“overshooting” of the interest rate is actually in line with the 
additional results presented by Gärtner and Griesbach,22 
which go beyond the baseline version used here.23 These 
results suggest that any downgrade, perhaps by disquieting 
markets, triggers a short-term overreaction of interest rates 
18 In total, the bank recapitalisation requirements ultimately summed 
up to about €70bn after a series of ever increasing estimates starting 
from €5.5bn in autumn 2008. See S. D e l l e p i a n e , N. H a rd i m a n , 
op. cit., p. 100.
19 CPI Financial: Fitch downgrades Ireland to “A+”; outlook negative. 7 
October 2010, available at  http://www.thefreelibrary.com/_/print/
PrintArticle.aspx?id=238897987.
20 M. G ä r t n e r, B. G r i e s b a c h , op. cit. 
21 According to the results presented by M. G ä r t n e r, B. G r i e s b a c h , 
F. J u n g : PIGS or Lambs? The European Sovereign Debt Crisis and 
the Role of Rating Agencies, in: International Advances in Economic 
Research, Vol. 17, No. 3, 2011, pp. 288-299, even rating changes that 
statistical methods cannot link to changes in fundamentals, and thus 
may appear erroneous or arbitrary, exert a signiﬁ cant inﬂ uence on in-
terest rates.
22 M. G ä r t n e r, B. G r i e s b a c h , op. cit. 
23 See Table 4 in M. G ä r t n e r, B. G r i e s b a c h , op. cit. 
Figure 5
Ireland in 2010
S o u rc e : Authors’ calculations based on estimates in M. G ä r t n e r, B. 
G r i e s b a c h : Rating agencies, self-fulﬁ lling prophecy and multiple equi-
libria? An empirical model of the European sovereign debt crisis 2009-
2011, University of St. Gallen, SEPS, Discussion Paper No. 2012-15, Fig-
ure 5(b).
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Caveats
Our discussion of Ireland’s crisis years (2007-2011) fo-
cussed on what we may call the “impact effect” of funda-
mentals on sovereign debt ratings. Technically, we looked 
at the horizontal shifts of the rating curve as the core driver 
of a country’s debt rating. Table 1 summarises this develop-
ment in column 2, repeating that in 2011 Ireland should have 
been dealt a 2.5 rating, which translates to an AA+ label 
with a negative watch. This contrasts sharply not only with 
Fitch’s ratings already discussed in the text and displayed 
in column 6 but also with the ratings issued by Moody’s and 
Standard & Poor’s. In the case of Moody’s, the gap between 
the prediction of the empirical model and the actual sover-
eign debt rating in 2011 is an astounding nine rating classes.
As mentioned above, the exclusive focus on the impact ef-
fect of fundamentals on default risk, which ignores indirect 
effects via the interest rate, may underestimate the required 
downgrade. The extent to which this happens is an empiri-
cal question. Hence, columns 3 and 4 look beyond the im-
pact effect. Column 3 reports the ratings that result when, 
instead of keeping it constant, the interest rate is updated 
every year with the endogenous prediction of the model. 
This dynamic simulation yields the short-run equilibria 
marked as black dots in Figures 2-6. As column 3 shows, 
there is a single year, 2008, during which this approach jus-
tiﬁ es a rating inferior to the rating derived from the impact 
effect.
Column 4 takes one step further and looks at the long-run 
equilibrium values, deﬁ ned by the points of intersection 
between the interest rate and the rating curves in Figures 
2-6. According to these equilibria, or longer-run gravitation 
points, the ratings should have been even better than those 
traced by the impact effects.
right by 0.3 notches (Figure 6). The actual rating remained 
at BBB+, 5.5 notches worse than suggested by the econo-
metric model.25 The interest rate receded by 0.9 percentage 
points to 8.2 per cent, but this may have been led by the 
drop in the risk-free (i.e. German) rate from 3.3 per cent to 
2.1 per cent. All in all, in terms of risk perception and the 
interest rate it paid on new debt, Ireland was still far away 
from where it should have been according to the patterns 
derived from the entire data set.
25 This did not make for a calm year on the rating front. Standard & 
Poor’s downgraded Ireland in three steps from A to BBB+, with a 
negative watch, and the rating by Moody’s was lowered from Baa1 to 
Baa3 to Ba1.
1 os = outlook stable; on = outlook negative; wn = watch negative. We translated negative outlook or watches into an 0.5 add-on in the numerical scale.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on estimates in M. Gärtner, B. Griesbach: Rating agencies, self-fulﬁ lling prophecy and multiple equilibria? An empiri-
cal model of the European sovereign debt crisis 2009-2011, University of St. Gallen, SEPS, Discussion Paper No. 2012-15, Figure 5(b).
Figure 6
Ireland in 2011
S o u rc e : Authors’ calculations based on estimates in M. G ä r t n e r, B. 
G r i e s b a c h : Rating agencies, self-fulﬁ lling prophecy and multiple equi-
libria? An empirical model of the European sovereign debt crisis 2009-
2011, University of St. Gallen, SEPS, Discussion Paper No. 2012-15, Fig-
ure 5(b).
Ratings predicted by model using: Actual ratings (end of year)1
Year Fundamentals 
only (impact 
effect)
Fundamentals 
and the predicted 
interest rate
Fundamentals and 
their long-run equi-
librium effect
Fundamentals 
and the actual 
interest rate
Fitch Moody’s Standard & 
Poor’s
2007 -0.3 -0.3 0.4 -0.3 1 (AAA; os) 1 (Aaa; os) 1 (AAA; os)
2008 1.1 1.8 0.9 1.5 1 (AAA; os) 1 (Aaa; os) 1 (AAA; os)
2009 1.5 1,3 1.6 2.2 4 (AA-; os) 2.5 (Aa1; on) 4.5 (AA; on)
2010 2.2 2.3 1.9 3.3 8 (BBB+; os) 8.5 (Baa1; on) 6.5 (A; wn)
2011 2.5 2.3 1.5 4.2 8.5 (BBB+; wn) 11.5 (Ba1; on) 8.5 (BBB+; wn)
Table 1
Predicted versus actual ratings
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cial markets and protect the country from becoming a col-
lateral victim of the ﬁ nancial crisis. Given this experience, 
it is difﬁ cult to understand how austerity could ever have 
acquired the status of a “miracle pill”, the ultimate safe-
guard against diseases originating from ﬁ nancial markets.
• Projected against an empirical model that explains the 
interaction between sovereign debt ratings and govern-
ment bond yields, and how this is related to the economy 
at large, since the turn of the millennium in a group of core 
OECD countries, the negative effects of the ﬁ nancial crisis 
on incomes and government ﬁ nances should never have 
triggered the massive upheaval in the market for govern-
ment bonds that occurred.
• Ireland’s treatment by the leading rating agencies was 
conspicuously outside the empirical pattern that can be 
derived from historical data. While we will probably never 
know what would have happened without these excessive 
downgrades and the apparent hyperactivity of the rat-
ing agencies with respect to sovereigns, such deviations 
have the potential to play an unfortunate role in a market in 
which multiple equilibria loom and any bad news, justiﬁ ed 
or not, may trigger crises and initiate self-propelling devel-
opments towards insolvency.
• Many factors contributed to the metamorphosis of the 
global ﬁ nancial crisis into what is now called the sovereign 
debt crisis. A number of these may be country-speciﬁ c. 
The list often mentioned in the case of Ireland, for example, 
includes an ill-designed industrial policy, the housing bub-
ble, an oversized banking sector, a lopsided tax system 
and questionable crisis management. Different lists, with 
overlaps, are offered for Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain. 
It would be implausible to deny such idiosyncratic factors. 
However, the common factors linking the experiences of 
many countries on Europe’s periphery are distorted de-
velopments and panic reactions in the ﬁ nancial markets, 
both as an initial trigger and as a propagating mechanism 
once the crisis was under way – with far-reaching political 
implications. This is the wider lesson from the Celtic Ti-
ger play offered here, and this is what policymakers need 
to address urgently. The European Commission took ﬁ rst 
steps with its new Directive 2013/14/EU, which is aimed 
at strengthening the regulatory framework of credit rating 
agencies.28
28 European Commission: Stricter rules for credit rating agencies to 
enter into force, Press Release, IP/13/555, Brussels, 18 June 2013. 
For a detailed discussion see e.g. B. P a u d y n : Credit rating agencies 
and the sovereign debt crisis: Performing the politics of creditworthi-
ness through risk and uncertainty, in: Review of International Political 
Economy, Vol. 20, No. 4, 2013, pp. 788-818. A brief comparison with 
the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act in the USA is done by K. L a n n o o : Rate the 
Rating Agencies!, in: Intereconomics, Vol. 46, No. 5, 2011, pp. 246-
247.
Finally, column 5 steps outside the model. The thought ex-
periment conducted here treats interest rates as an exog-
enous variable. The question asked is whether the actually 
observed increases in the interest rate, even if they cannot 
be tracked by the empirical model, would have justiﬁ ed the 
actual downgrades.26 While the explosion of Irish interest 
rates in 2010 and 2011, taken as an exogenous event, would 
indeed have justiﬁ ed a downgrade to AA-, even this rating 
falls far short of the actual ratings, and a gap of four to seven 
rating classes remains unexplained.
Summary and conclusions
Our quantitative exercise reveals and underscores a num-
ber of insights regarding Ireland’s recent struggle. However, 
many of these apply to other countries on the periphery of 
the euro area as well, and to Europe’s sovereign debt crisis 
years at large:
• The main trigger and driving force behind the budget and 
debt problems in many European countries and beyond 
is the ﬁ nancial crisis that erupted in 2008 and the havoc 
it played with government revenues and spending. The 
labels “sovereign debt crisis” and “euro crisis” that have 
been applied to these developments are misnomers.27 
Their uncritical adoption by wider circles in academia, the 
media and – rather strangely – politicians, despite easily 
accessible evidence to the contrary, remains a puzzle. 
Future research, preferably with an interdisciplinary ap-
proach, will have to explore the mechanisms that were 
at work. As an immediate effect, this mislabelling has led 
many of the recent discussions and policy efforts in the 
wrong direction, while insufﬁ cient attention is being paid 
to the issues that caused and fuelled the ﬁ nancial crisis in 
the ﬁ rst place.
• Related to the previous point, the Irish experience un-
derscores that the mantra-like reference to governments 
or countries “living beyond their means” is equally mis-
leading. If there ever was a country in recent history that 
showed the determination and resourcefulness, and 
mustered the political consensus, to deal with debt levels 
that were considered excessive, it was Ireland. However, 
bringing the debt level down from 110 per cent to 25 per 
cent of GDP, near the very low end of the European spec-
trum, in two decades was still not enough to soothe ﬁ nan-
26 Another way to look at this exercise is to use actual interest rates rath-
er than the ones generated by the empirical model. Then we open the 
door for self-fulﬁ lling prophecy to become part of the “explanation”. 
When a downgrade, even if not justiﬁ ed by fundamentals, raises the 
interest rate, it may generate (part of) its own justiﬁ cation.
27 This insight is not really new but begs to be repeated. For an early, 
comprehensive argument in this direction see R. N e u b ä u m e r, op. 
cit.
